

ETHICAL LISTS IN 1 PETER

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Lists of vices and virtues were common in the Greco-Roman era.¹ The studies of Vögtle and Wibbing demonstrate the ubiquity of lists of virtues and vices found in both literary and non-literary sources throughout the Greco-Roman world.² Given the relative absence of such lists from the LXX,³ Talmud and

1. John T. Fitzgerald, 'Virtue/Vice Lists', in David Noel Freedman (ed.), *The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary* (6 vols.; New York: Doubleday, 1992), VI, pp. 857-59. Examples include Pseudo-Aristotle, *Virt. vit.*, Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.11-27; *Inv.* 2.53-54, 159,164; Pseudo-Diogenes, *Ep.* 28; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.4, 6, 13; 2.75; 3.5, 39-41; 4.83-96; 8.8; 23.7; 44.10; 49.9; 62.2; 66.1; 69.6, 9; Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.* 7.92-93, 110-112; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.8.23; 3.20.5-6; 14.8; 16.14; Horace, *Ep.* 1.1.33-40; 6.12; Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 36.4c; Seneca the Younger, *Brev. vit.* 10.2-4; 22.11; Musonius Rufus 16; Plutarch, *Mor.* 12B; 465D; 468B; 523D; Vergil, *Aen.* 6.732; Lucian, *Pisc.* 15-17. What constitutes a 'list' is of course subjective, and some may question whether or not these are in fact virtue/vice lists. However, these are the ones most commonly referenced by various scholars.

2. A. Vögtle, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament* (Aschen-dorff: Münster, 1936), pp. 13-18; S. Wibbing, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament und ihre Traditionsgeschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Qumran-Texte* (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1959), pp. 15-23.

3. Wibbing, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge*, p. 26. However, see René A. López, 'Vice Lists in Non-Pauline Sources', *BSac* 168 (2011) pp. 178-95 (178-80), for various possible parallels. Lists of virtues may be found in Exod. 31.3; 34.6-7; 35.31; Num. 14.18; Job 1.1, 8; 2.3; Ps. 15.1-5; 86.15; 103.8; Eccl. 2.26; Jer. 7.5-6; Ezek. 18.5-9, 14-17; Jon. 4.2. Lists of vices may be found in Prov. 6.16-19; 8.13-14; Jer. 7.9; Ezek. 18.10-13, 18; Hos. 4.1-2.

midrashim,⁴ there is some question about whether these ideas were adopted by Christianity from Hellenistic Judaism⁵ or directly from Greco-Roman thinking. First Peter has three vice (2.1; 4.3, 15) and one virtue catalogue (3.8).⁶ These lists comprise two polysyndetic (2.1, *καί*; 4.15, *ἦ*) and two asyndetic (3.8; 4.3) forms. One of them is found in the *Haustafel* (3.8) and the others form part of Peter's paraenesis. Given that there are a multitude of virtues and vices from which Peter could have chosen,⁷ are we to see these lists as *conventional*, i.e. a mere repetition of common pagan ideals, or as *contextual*, i.e. specifically related to the issues of Peter's discourse? The aim here is to investigate the meaning of these vices and virtues and what they reveal concerning the audiences and the purpose of Peter's epistle. Betz suggests that 'the individual concepts are not in any way specifically "Christian", but represent the conventional morality of the time.'⁸ This takes the virtue/vice lists as conventional. Horrell, on the other hand, suggests that 'Paul utilizes a traditional form but does not simply reproduce some supposedly standard content.'⁹ Aune declares that, 'Despite the traditional character of such lists, several of them were specifically aimed at problems experienced by local

4. G. Mussies, 'Catalogues of Sins and Virtues Personified', in R. van den Broek and M. J. Vermaseren (eds.), *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions Presented to Gilles Quispel on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday* (Leiden: Brill, 1981), pp. 315-35 (319 and n. 11). But see *m. 'Abot.* 3.11; 4.21; *b. Sanh.* 75a.

5. *4 Macc.* 1.2-4, 18, 26-27; 2.15; 5.23-24; 8.3; *Wis.* 8.7; 14.22-27; *Philo, Sacr.* 15-33; *Leg.* 86-87; *Virt.* 182; *Sib. Or.* 2.254-282; 3.377-380; *1 En.* 10.20; 91.6-7; *2 En.* 9.1; 10.4-6; 34.1-2; 66.6; *Jub.* 7.20-21; 21.21; 23.14. See also *Test. 12 Patr.* (e.g. *T. Levi* 17.11; *T. Iss.* 7.2-6; *T. Reub.* 3.3-8) and *2 Bar.* 4.17; 8.5; 13.4.

6. On virtue/vice lists in early Christian writings, see B.S. Easton, 'New Testament Ethical Lists', *JBL* 51 (1932), pp. 1-12; N.J. McEleney, 'The Vice Lists of the Pastoral Epistles', *CBQ* 36 (1974), pp. 203-19; E. Schweizer, 'Traditional Ethical Patterns in the Pauline and Post-Pauline Letters and their Development', in E. Best and R. McL. Wilson (eds.), *Text and Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 195-209; René A. López, 'A Study of Pauline Passages with Vice Lists', *BSac* 168 (2011), pp. 301-16.

7. Philo identifies 147 vices in *Sacr.* 15-33.

8. H.D. Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1979), p. 282.

9. David G. Horrell, *Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul's Ethics* (London: T. & T. Clark, 2005), p. 159.

communities.¹⁰ Rather than asking a wide-angled question regarding the use of such lists in early Christianity, my focus here is on 1 Peter. The question we will explore here is whether or not these lists are merely the repetition of conventional material or specifically material that is significant for Peter's discourse and audience.

Even if we suggest the material is conventional, belonging to Hellenistic philosophy or early Christian paraenesis, that does not preclude us understanding these lists as specifically related to the contextual issues faced by the Petrine communities. Given the uniqueness of these lists, which includes items not mentioned in other ethical lists, we may deduce that Peter has specifically designed his lists for these Christians. If rhetoric is 'the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatsoever' (Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.2.1), and Peter hopes to persuade his readers to listen and adopt his strategy then it seems likely these lists are important for these Christians. Good rhetoric typically has relevance to the audience addressed.¹¹ Therefore, even if the virtue/vice lists are *conventional* items from Hellenistic Judaism or the Greco-Roman world, this does not necessitate that they are irrelevant to the situations Peter addressed. The audience listening carefully to this letter would hear these virtues and vices as coming from Peter, because they are part of his discourse. They are thus to accept what Peter says, even if the material is found to be conventional. If conventional, Peter has no doubt incorporated the material because it coheres with his purpose and exhortation to these communities. The contemporary reader is thus bound to presume that these lists communicate what Peter wants them to communicate. And the original audiences would hear this as a seamless part of the oral performance of the letter to the various communities.¹² As Mal-

10. David E. Aune, *The New Testament in its Literary Environment* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987), p. 195.

11. David E. Aune, *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christianity Literature and Rhetoric* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), pp. 89-91.

12. On the role of the letter-carrier, see E. Randolph Richards, *Paul and First-Century Letter Writing: Secretaries, Composition and Collection* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), pp. 201-9; Peter Head, 'Named Letter Carriers among the Oxyrhynchus Papyri', *JSNT* 31 (2009) pp. 279-99; Margaret M. Mitchell, 'New Testament Envoys in the Context of Greco-Roman Diplomatic and Epistolary Conventions: The Example of Timothy and Titus', *JBL* 111 (1992) pp. 641-62.

herbe acknowledges, ‘In their content they tended to represent generally held views; nevertheless the presence or absence of certain items reflected the values of their authors.’¹³ We must therefore focus our efforts on understanding these lists as intimately connected to the narrative context of 1 Peter, and the specific role these lists might play in helping advance Peter’s strategy to help these Christians.¹⁴ In discussing Paul’s use of various sources, Furnish comes to the following conclusion:

Without detracting from the importance of the insight that Paul’s concrete ethical teachings are in large measure derived from traditional sources, both Christian and non-Christian, it must also be emphasized that he has, in most cases, exercised his own critical judgement in selecting these materials and has assimilated them into significantly new contexts. He has not been simply a collector and curator of miscellaneous moral advice; the impress of his own interests, perspectives, and objectives has been left upon them to a greater extent than Dibelius, for example, was inclined to acknowledge.¹⁵

We will show that this insight regarding Paul’s use of traditional materials also holds true for 1 Peter who has carefully selected the virtues and vices and used them as part of his strategy.

The Vices in 1 Peter 2.1

The pericope of 2.1-3, while constituting a specific subunit, nevertheless carries forward the discussion of 1.22-25 by describing first negatively (2.1) and then positively (2.2-3) how the community may live together in ‘obedience to the truth’ and ‘genuine mutual love’ (1.22). By avoiding the vices in 2.1, they are shown how they may ‘long for the pure spiritual milk’ and thereby ‘grow into salvation’ (2.2). In what follows we will explore each of the

13. A.J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation, A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), p. 138.

14. E.g. M. Eugene Boring, *1 Peter* (Abingdon New Testament Commentaries; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1999), p. 91, who says, ‘the author’s selection is not random ...’

15. V.P. Furnish, *Theology and Ethics in Paul* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), p. 81.

vices in 2.1 and how they relate to the wider discourse of 1 Peter, and the specific units of 1.22-25 and 2.1-3. We shall see if these vices have a heritage in the LXX and Second Temple Judaism, or whether they are more at home within Greco-Roman thinking. More specifically, at the end of our analysis we will question whether or not these vices are merely conventional, or whether the author has intentionally chosen them because they aid his strategy and comport with the rest of his discourse.¹⁶

Kakía

While the word is found throughout the LXX, it is prevalent in Greco-Roman moral discourse.¹⁷ BDAG notes that *κακία* ‘is the opposite of *ἀρετή* and ... therefore lacking in social value’.¹⁸ In Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.9.1) a prominent *topos* is *ἀρετή* (virtue) and *κακία* (vice). It is also used this way throughout Pseudo-Aristotle, *Virt. vit.*¹⁹ In a discussion of moral responsibility and vice Xenophon in talking about Socrates states, ‘If there was anything base in his own life, he might fairly have been thought vicious. But, if his own conduct was always prudent (*σώφρονων*), how can he be fairly held to blame for the evil (*κακίας*) that was not in him?’ (Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.2.28). Xenophon explicitly contrasts *κακία* with the virtue *σωφροσύνη*. Thus, *κακία* refers to the evil that negates virtuous existence in community.

Kakía is found in early Christian vice lists (Rom. 1.29; Col. 3.8; Eph. 4.31; Tit. 3.3). Paul used it specifically of sexual immorality (1 Cor. 5.8) but also more generally (1 Cor. 14.20). Luke (Acts 8.22), James (1.21), and the Jesus tradition (Mt. 6.34) also use it in a more general sense.

The *κακία* word-group appears as a recurring theme in 1 Peter concerning evil deeds (2.12, 14-16; 3.9-12, 17; 4.15). Achilles further notes that it is often

16. In these sections I consider nouns as well as related verbs.

17. K.H. Jobes, *1 Peter* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), p. 131.

18. BDAG, s.v. ‘*κακία*’; see also Charles W. Hedrick Jr, ‘Imitating Virtue and Avoiding Vice: Ethical Functions of Biography, History, and Philosophy’, in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 425; Arthur W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960), pp. 172-79.

19. 1.1, 3; 3.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; 8.4. Contrasting *ἀρετή* and *κακία* also occurs in Plato, *Meno* 72A; Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.1.26; Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 7.1; Plutarch, *Mor.* 141D.

contrasted in classical Greek with ἀγαθός, which is another recurring motif in 1 Peter (2.18; 3.10-11, 13, 16-17, 21).²⁰ Thus, Peter is here describing activity that lacks good and is consonant with evil in ways that are both familiar to those with knowledge of Jewish and pagan traditions. Such an activity undermines the social cohesion of the community.²¹ This general vice cannot be merely understood as a conventional addition. Rather, Peter advocates against what is considered harmful and destructive as a means of aiding this community in their negotiation of the social tensions provoked by their exclusive commitment to Christ. Thus, it serves his specific paraenetic strategy.

Δόλος

Δόλος refers to those ‘taking advantage through craft and underhanded methods’.²² The word literally meant ‘bait for fish’ and was used for ‘any cunning contrivance for deceiving’.²³ This is illustrated by Herodotus (1.212) who tells the story of Tomyris’s response to Cyrus, who *tricking* (δολώσας) her son with drugs, did not have to face him in battle. Lucian (*Hermot.* 59) critiques the philosophers by comparing them to wine merchants who dilute wine with water and thus of *adulterating* (δολώσαντες) their teaching for profit. Aeschylus (*Ag.* 273) uses it of being potentially tricked by the gods. Dio Chrysostom uses the word to describe a tyrant (*Or.* 6.50, 52). It is interesting to note that Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 32.11; cf. 12.48) uses ἄδολος as a key description of an ideal leader:

But to find a man who in plain terms and *without guile* (ἀδόλως) speaks his mind with frankness, and neither for the sake of reputation nor for gain makes false pretensions, but out of good will and concern for his fellow-men stands ready, if need be, to submit to ridicule and to the disorder and the uproar of the mob — to find such a man as that is not easy, but rather the good fortune of a very lucky city.

The city will benefit from leaders who are not *tricking* or *deceiving* the people they are leading.

20. E. Achilles, ‘κακός’, *NIDNTT*, I, pp. 561-64 (561). See further S. du Toit, ‘Negotiating Hostility through Beneficial Deeds’, *TynBul* 70 (2019), pp. 221-43.

21. Paul J. Achtemeier, *1 Peter: A Commentary on First Peter* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), p. 144.

22. BDAG, s.v. ‘δόλος’.

23. LSJ, s.v. ‘δόλος’. Emphasis original.

The word δόλος is common in the LXX and is described by Muraoka as ‘deception’.²⁴ This is illustrated by the story of Jacob and Esau where Jacob deceitfully steals his brother’s blessing (Gen. 27.35). In early Christian writings it appears as part of vice lists (Mk 7.22; Rom. 1.29; Did. 5.1; Barn. 20.1).²⁵ Paul uses the word in 2 Corinthians (4.2; 11.13; 12.16), likely to describe those who oppose him through underhanded methods.

It is used three times in 1 Peter (2.1, 22; 3.10). The reference in 1 Pet. 2.22 is to Jesus, within an allusion to Isa. 53.9. Thus, Peter notes that δὲς ἀμαρτίαν οὐκ ἐποίησεν οὐδὲ εὐρέθη δόλος ἐν τῷ στόματι αὐτοῦ. This suggests that, in spite of the opposition Jesus faced, his response was holy and honorable, thus, providing an exemplary model for the community (2.21) currently facing the temptation to respond inappropriately due to their own suffering from pagan harassment (cf. 3.9-12).²⁶ This fits well with the final reference (3.10), which is situated at the end of the *Haustafeln*, and which deals with interpersonal and communal relationships where the audience might be tempted to engage in retaliation, specifically of a verbal kind. Building on a quotation from Ps. 34.10, the writer instructs the audience to not engage in retaliation (3.9), but rather to engage in an act of blessing, where they seek peace (3.11) with people, and not to take advantage or speak evil to those who have wronged the Christians. Thus, coming back to the reference in the vice list of 2.1, the community is being instructed to discard evil tactics which are destructive and undermine their identity as those who have been ‘born anew’ (1.23) and instructed to ‘grow into salvation’ (2.2). It is here in 2.2 that Peter describes the milk that sustains as ἄδολος, meaning ‘without deceit’ or ‘unadulterated’.²⁷ To practice *deceit* would be to undermine the integrity of their primary role-

24. Takamitsu Muraoka, *A Greek–English Lexicon of the Septuagint* (Louvain: Peeters, 2009), p. 175.

25. For other early Christian uses, see Mt. 26.4; Mk 14.1; Jn 1.47; Acts 13.10; 1 Thess. 2.3; 1 Clem. 16.10; 22.3; 35.5; 50.6; Ign. *Eph.* 7.1; Ign. *Pol.* 8.1.

26. J.R. Michaels, *1 Peter* (WBC, 49; Waco, TX: Word, 1988), pp. 85-86, who notes that it is ‘as appropriate to the believers’ relationship to pagan society in general as to their relationship to one another . . . [This] is a temptation for Christian believers either among themselves or in relation to their pagan fellow citizens, and Peter has not focused his attention on either of these possible situations to the exclusion of the other.’

27. BDAG, s.v. ‘ἄδολος’.

model (2.21-23) and engagement with outsiders which is meant to be characterized by virtue (3.9-12; 16).

Ἵποκρίσις

Ἵποκρίσις is a rare word in the LXX, but not in the Greco-Roman world. The connotation of deceptive or false speech is found in Lucian (*Somn.* 17). Polybius uses it of the Arevacae, who ‘assumed a *feigned* (ὑπόκρισιν) tone of submission and humility in the language of their answer, without being, as was evident, at all yielding in their hearts or acknowledging themselves beaten’ (*Hist.* 35.2.13). It describes the activity of creating an impression or persona ‘that is at odds with one’s real purposes or motivations’.²⁸ It is connected to the notion of play-acting or pretending, but with a negative taint. Epictetus illustrates this by referring to a Jew who is merely “acting the part” (*Diatr.* 2.9.20) and not living consistently with his own principles. Greco-Roman moralists used this term to describe moral pretense. Plutarch uses it in his denunciation of flatterers who corrupt children (*Mor.* 13B) by teaching them to pretend to be friends for dishonest gain. Marcus Aurelius uses the term to describe tyrants (*Med.* 1.11) and also in a list of vices (*Med.* 3.7).

Ἵποκρίσις and cognates are not common in the LXX.²⁹ Eleazar is encouraged to pretend to eat sacrificial pork but considers such an action tantamount to apostasy (2 Macc. 6.24-25):

Such pretence (ὑποκριθῆναι) is unworthy of my advanced age. My pretence for the sake of a brief transitory span of life would cause many of the younger generation to think that Eleazar at the age of ninety had gone over to the gentile way of life, and so they, too, would go astray because of me, and I would earn the defilement and besmirching of my old age.³⁰

Apollonius ‘pretended (ὑποκριθείς) to have peaceful intentions’ when he arrived in Jerusalem but was there for war (2 Macc. 5.25). This usage indicates that more than deception is at work.

28. BDAG, s.v. ‘ὑποκρίσις’.

29. See also *Pss. Sol.* 4.6, 20, 22; *Sir.* 1.29; 32.15; 33.2.

30. The translation is from Jonathan A. Goldstein, *II Maccabees: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (New York: Doubleday, 1983), p. 281.

In Matthew's tradition hypocrisy is a key theme.³¹ 'The primary charge against the scribes and Pharisees, articulated at one level as that of being "hypocrites", is that they do not do what they are meant to do, and indeed what they teach others to do.'³² This is epitomized in Jesus' critique that they should not be imitated for they fail to practice what they teach (Mt. 23.3). Here the emphasis is on an inconsistency and contradiction between teaching and praxis. Paul uses the term to describe the inconsistency of the behavior of Peter in separating from the Gentiles around table-fellowship (Gal. 2.13). The author of 1 Tim. 4.2 uses it to describe his opponents as the source of false teaching. Using the term as a reference to false teachers is a regular feature of the term in the apostolic fathers.³³

In 1 Pet. 1.22 the community is exhorted to love 'without hypocrisy' (*ἀνυπόκριτος*).³⁴ This helps us to see this vice as a description of the antithesis of the Christian community advocated by Peter. They are not to engage in deceptive or 'manipulative role-playing'.³⁵ Peter has utilized a vice common in the Greco-Roman world to exhort his audiences to integrity of speech and character which is honest. There must be a consistency between what they believe and the way they live their lives. As those facing significant social hostility from outsiders, hypocrisy would undermine the solidarity of the Christian community, a solidarity needed to aid one another through the fire of tribulation (1.6-7; 4.12). Hypocrisy would further undermine the credibility and integrity of their witness which is contingent upon their virtuous lifestyle (cf. 2.11-12; 3.1-2, 15-16). Thus, its inclusion in this vice catalogue is specifically related to the issues present in the letter.

31. See Mt. 6.2, 5, 16; 7.5; 15.7; 22.18; 23.3, 13, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29; 24.51; cf. Mk 7.6; 12.15 and Lk. 6.42; 12.1, 56; 13.15; 20.20.

32. Christopher Tuckett, 'Matthew and Hypocrisy', in D.M. Gurtner et al. (eds.), *Jesus, Matthew's Gospel and Early Christianity: Studies in Memory of Graham N. Stanton* (London: T. & T. Clark, 2011), pp. 152-65 (154).

33. 1 Clem. 15.1; Barn. 19.2; 20.1; 21.4; Ign. *Magn.* 3.2; Ign. *Pol.* 6.3; Did. 4.12; 5.1; 8.1; Herm. Vis. 3.6.1; Herm. Mand. 2.1.5; 8.1.3; Herm. Sim. 8.6.2; 9.27.2.

34. Another rare word, found in Wis. 5.18; 18.15; Rom. 12.9; 2 Cor. 6.6; 1 Tim. 1.5; 2 Tim. 1.5; Jas 3.17; 1 Pet. 1.22. cf. Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* 69.

35. Betz, *Galatians*, p. 110, describes *ὑποκρίσις* as 'manipulative role-playing'.

Φθόνος

Aristotle described φθόνος as ‘a disturbing pain excited by the prosperity of others’,³⁶ and it may be translated as either ‘envy’ or ‘jealousy’. It is a common *topos* of ethical discourse amongst Greco-Roman authors.³⁷ Perhaps following the view of Aristotle, Plutarch states that ‘envy is pain at another’s good, while malignancy is joy at another’s evil; and both spring from a savage and bestial affliction, a vicious nature’ (Mor. 518C). Φθόνος is always described as a vice, one that particularly destroys relational harmony.³⁸ An example of this is seen in the orations of Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 77; 78) entitled *περὶ φθόνου*, which discuss the way envy can lead to the destruction of relationships and even violence.

The word is rare among Hellenistic Jewish sources (1 Macc. 8.16; 3 Macc. 6.7; Wis. 2.24; 6.23). Muraoka describes it as ‘malevolent envy’.³⁹ Amongst early Christian writings, it is found in the vice catalogues of Rom. 1.29; Gal. 5.21; 1 Tim. 6.4 and Tit. 3.3.⁴⁰ Peter’s appeal to this vice probably comes from its prevalence in Greco-Roman sources.

Given the precarious social situation of these Christians, communal solidarity and harmony are of the utmost importance (1.22; 2.9-10; 3.8).⁴¹ It is not difficult to imagine slaves being envious of those freeborn or of those who were wealthier in the community (3.3). We might even imagine envy be-

36. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1386b18-19. See also Aristotle, *Eth. eud.* 1233b20-26, who says, ‘Envy is pain felt at deserved good fortune, while the feeling of the malicious man has itself no name, but such a man shows his nature by rejoicing over undeserved ill fortune. Between them is the man inclined to righteous indignation, the name given by the ancients to pain felt at either good or bad fortune if undeserved, or to joy felt at them if deserved.’

37. L.T. Johnson, ‘James 3:13–4:10 and the *Topos* *περὶ φθόνου*’, *NovT* 25 (1983) pp. 327-47 (334-41); Bruce Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Atlanta: Westminster John Knox, 1993), pp. 90-116. See further Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.10; Cyprian, *Zel. liv.*; Basil’s homily on envy. A helpful, though dated, study, comes from P. Walcott, *Envy and the Greeks: A Study of Human Behaviour* (Warminster: Aris & Philips, 1978).

38. Cf. *T. Sim.* 4.8. See the helpful discussion in Johnson, ‘James 3:13–4:10’, 336-38.

39. Muraoka, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 714.

40. Other references include Mt. 27.18; Mk 15.10; Rom. 1.29; Gal. 5.21; Phil. 1.15; Jas 4.5; 1 Clem. 3.2; 4.7, 13; 5.2.

41. *Jobes, I Peter*, 131.

tween slaves with masters who were harsh and others who were good. The vice of *envy* is something that would undermine the solidarity of the Christian communities, and their relationships with outsiders.⁴²

Καταλαλιά

Achtemeier notes that *καταλαλιά* ‘probably refers to habitual disparagement of others rather than some kind of openly slanderous speech’.⁴³ The theme of slanderous speech is well documented in the Jewish and Greco-Roman world, and its disastrous effects are illustrated in various writers.⁴⁴ Hesiod makes the connection between speech and retaliation clear: ‘If [a man] wrongs you first, offending either in word or deed, remember to repay him double.’⁴⁵ It is important to see that a cause of retaliation is an insult or ‘apparent slight’ or ‘belittling’. Aristotle states that there are ‘three species of belittling: contempt [*kataphronēsis*], spite [*epēreasmōs*], and insult [*hybris*].’⁴⁶ Lendon comments: ‘Insult bred insult in return, and the two parties might descend into a state of long-term mutual abuse, *inimicitia* (enmity), punctuated, where opportunity offered, by legal or political attacks.’⁴⁷ Aristotle states clearly that ‘it is slavish to put up with being insulted oneself or to overlook insults to those close to one’ (*Eth. nic.* 1126a). Seneca the Younger discusses ‘slaves who would prefer to be whipped than to be slapped, and who believe death and beatings more tolerable than scornful words’ (*Const.* 5.1). Although invective was a common part of Roman politics, and something that was not considered uncouth,⁴⁸ beyond the forum of political debate, insult was considered dishonorable and required revenge. This is because of the disastrous effects on one’s honor that slander could have. This is illustrated by Plutarch

42. J.H. Elliott, *I Peter*. (AB, 37B; New York: Doubleday, 2000), p. 396.

43. Achtemeier, *I Peter*, p. 144.

44. See the discussion in William R. Baker, *Personal Speech-Ethics in the Epistle of James* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994), pp. 27-68.

45. Hesiod, *Op.* 706-711.

46. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.2.3. The translation is from Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (trans. George A. Kennedy; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2006).

47. J.E. Lendon, ‘Roman Honor’, in Michael Peachin (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 377-403 (381).

48. Lendon, ‘Roman Honor’, 387-88.

who gives much attention to the results of speaking against someone with malicious intent.⁴⁹

While conceptually ubiquitous the specific word-group is not found in many Jewish writings.⁵⁰ Baker notes that according to the Hebrew Scriptures, ‘Gossip decisively becomes slander when the repeated information is false, known to be false, or purposely twisted in such a way as to misrepresent someone or situations involving him. A certain sinister motivation is part of the makeup of the slanderer which may or may not provide the motivation for the gossip.’⁵¹ The Decalogue specifically prohibits testifying ‘falsely against your neighbor with false witness’ (Exod. 20.16 NETS). The psalmist describes a sinner: ‘Your mouth increased in evil, and your tongue would wrap deceitfulness. Sitting you would speak against [κατελάλεις] your brother’ (49.19-20 NETS). The psalmist further encourages one to ‘chase away’ ‘the one who was secretly slandering his fellow’ (Ps. 100.5).

It is common among vice lists in early Christian literature (Rom. 1.30; 1 Clem. 30.1, 3; 35.5; 2 Clem. 4.3; Pol. 2.2; 4.3; Barn. 20.2; Herm. Man. 8.1.3 and Herm. Sim. 9.15.3).⁵² This vice was seen as destructive to communal relationships (cf. Jas 4.11 and 3.9). Discussing Jas 4.11, Baker states that the ‘word refers here to the array of disparaging things one can say to, about or which affect another.’⁵³ But this applies equally to our understanding of the term in other vice lists. Hermas connects slander with dissension and harmony and sees it as something that undermines peaceful relationships and is the work of demonic forces (Herm. Man. 2.2-3). Not only does this fit with the other vices which undermine relationships and communal solidarity, but it also is a key element in Peter’s speech ethics. This instruction is necessary as these Christians might be tempted to engage in a riposte of slander against those who speak evil of them, hence the instruction to not engage in verbal

49. See Plutarch, *Mor.* 457D-458B, 462C. See Baker, *Personal Speech-Ethics*, 159-67.

50. In the LXX version of Num. 12.8; 21.5, 7; Ps. 49.20; 77.19; 100.5; 118.23; Prov. 20.13; Job 19.3; Hos. 7.13; Mic. 3.7; Mal. 3.13, 16; Wis. 1.11; and in the Old Testament pseudepigrapha *I En.* 1.9; 3.4; *T. Isaac* 3.4; *T. Gad* 5.4.

51. Baker, *Personal Speech-Ethics*, 142.

52. Other references include 2 Cor. 12.20; Jas 4.11; 1 Clem. 35.8; Herm. Mand. 2.2-3; Herm. Sim. 23.2-3.

53. Baker, *Personal Speech-Ethics*, 178.

or physical retaliation in 3.9. The negation of this vice is thus a key element in Peter's instruction regarding how they are to respond to outsiders.

Conventional and Contextual

Is this list taken from Jewish and or Greco-Roman sources arbitrarily or does this list fit within the strategy of 1 Peter, interconnected with his discourse? We shall argue for various connections between this list and the wider narrative of 1 Peter, and thus demonstrate that this list is not random, but specifically suited to the audiences Peter is addressing.

The first vice *κακία* occurs in many places throughout 1 Peter suggesting that it relates specifically to the exhortation Peter is offering. *κακός* is used five times in 1 Pet. 3.9-12; *κακοποιέω* is found in 3.17; *κακώω* is used in 3.13 and *κακοποιός* is found three times in 2.12, 14 and 4.15. Thus, the word group is used throughout 1 Peter, and the use in 2.1 is not arbitrary but connected to the wider discourse and strategy of 1 Peter about deeds that are inappropriate for those who follow the paradigm of Jesus. This is specifically to be understood in contrast to the theme of 'beneficial deeds' which is a central concern of 1 Peter.⁵⁴

Then, two of the vices have counterparts in close proximity, suggesting an intentional pairing of opposites. First, *δόλος* in 2.1 is contrasted with *ἄδολος* in 2.2. The community is instructed to get rid of *πάντα δόλον* so that they can enjoy the *ἄδολον γάλα* (2.2). Second, *ὑποκρίσις* in 2.1 is contrasted with *ἀνυπόκριτος* in 1.22. The Christian communities are reminded that they have been purified by their obedience to the 'truth' and their 'without hypocrisy' love, which is why they must continually rid themselves of *ὑποκρίσις*. These paired opposites establish a connection between 1.22-25 and 2.1-3, suggesting a literary design which implies intentionality. Thus, these vices cannot be mere random selections.

The final vice mentioned, *καταλαλιά*, like the first vice *κακία*, is interwoven throughout 1 Peter and is a prominent theme within the discourse (2.12, 15; 3.16; cf. 3.9-10). Jesus is given as an example of someone who does not engage in a riposte of verbal abuse towards those who persecuted him (2.23). This vice is thus shown to be directly relevant to the audience's predicament. Peter elsewhere refers to his readers as potential victims rather than perpetrators of slander (2.12, 15; 3.16), but his concern in the present in-

54. See du Toit, 'Negotiating Hostility'.

stance is that they themselves not adopt the behavior of those who denounce them, either by trading insults with their enemies (3.9; cf. 2.23) or by speaking evil of one another. Instead of speaking evil to anyone they are specifically exhorted to engage in blessing others (3.9, cf. 4.11), even those who revile them (2.12; cf. 4.14).

The vices in 2.1 relate to activities that undermine the social cohesion of the Christian community, and the integrity of the Christians in their interaction with pagans (2.12; 3.1-2). They are therefore relevant to the situation as described by Peter. ‘Without stating explicitly what he is doing, Peter now begins to speak concretely of how Christians should conduct themselves at every level, both among themselves and in the wider society.’⁵⁵ This is necessary if they are to survive the social prejudice inflicted upon them by outsiders. Therefore, this vice list fits closely within the strategy of 1 Peter and is thus shown to be an integrated component of this epistle and *not* the mere restating of conventional Hellenistic vices.

The Vices in 1 Peter 4.15

First Peter 4.15 is found within a pericope beginning in 4.12 with the appellation, ἀγαπητοί and ending with the commendation to entrust themselves as they suffer to a πιστὸς κτίστης (4.19). The passage has a distinctive apocalyptic feel, as Peter exhorts them concerning the πειρασμός. It is within this context that 4.15 is to be understood.⁵⁶ This verse ‘identifies four kinds of persons Christians are to avoid being, lest their suffering be for the wrong reason’.⁵⁷ Peter here offers a vice list of offences that offer a counter-productive way of life which will incur suffering. We shall see that these vices are common to both Jewish and Greco-Roman thinking.

55. Michaels, *1 Peter*, 85.

56. Mark Dubis, ‘First Peter and the “Sufferings of the Messiah”’, in David W. Baker (ed.), *Looking into the Future: Evangelical Studies in Eschatology* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), pp. 85-96 (92), who says, ‘Mindful that his readers live in the last days, Peter warns his readers not to capitulate to the temptation to sin, especially as society becomes increasingly depraved with the approach of the eschaton. If the readers suffer, it must not be because they themselves have joined in the lawlessness that marks the eschatological climax. Rather, they must hold fast to their Christian confession, as verse 16 urges.’

57. Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, 309.

ΦΟΝΕΥΣ

Φονεύς refers to a ‘murderer’ or one who slaughters others.⁵⁸ This act refers to the intentional and malicious killing of people, and is therefore distinguished from simply killing a person.⁵⁹ ‘Murder’ had a particular understanding within the Greco-Roman context, especially during the republic when there was no law against ‘murder’.⁶⁰ The distinctiveness arises from the rights of those with power, such as the paterfamilias who had the authority to execute those within his household, without it being an official crime.⁶¹ The *lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis* which was effective during the time of early Christianity however, did make provisions within the law against murder in various circumstances (e.g. poisoning, patricide, etc.).⁶² Although there are no common proverbs or sayings explicitly prohibiting murder, it is assumed that murder is morally wrong by various writers.⁶³ As Sallust writes:

I propose that whereas the Republic has been placed in the greatest peril, and whereas these wicked citizens have been convicted by the evidence of the Allobroges, and whereas they have confessed that they

58. BDAG, s.v. ‘φονεύς’. It is found in Wis. 12.5; Mt. 22.7; Acts 3.14; 7.52; 28.4; Rev. 21.8; 22.15; Barn. 20.2; Did. 5.2. See also φόνοϋς in Exod. 5.3; 17.13; 22.1; Lev. 26.7; Num. 21.24; Deut. 13.16; 20.13; 22.8; 28.22; Jdt. 2.11; 8.22; 9.3; 2 Macc. 4.3, 35; 3 Macc. 3.25; Prov. 1.18; 28.17; Job 21.22; Wis. 14.25; Hos. 4.2; Jer. 22.17; Ezek. 43.7-9; Mt. 15.19; Mk 7.21; 15.7; Lk. 23.19, 25; Acts 9.1; Rom. 1.29; Heb. 11.37; Rev. 9.21; Barn. 20.1; Did. 3.2; 5.1.

59. Judy E. Gaughan, *Murder Was Not a Crime: Homicide and Power in the Roman Republic* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), p. 2.

60. See especially, Gaughan, *Murder Was Not a Crime*.

61. Gaughan, *Murder Was Not a Crime*, pp. 27, 52. See also Teresa Morgan, *Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 182, who notes that, ‘Killing an enemy in war, for instance, in most societies does not count as murder; neither does judicial killing by the state. In some societies, killing an attacker in self-defence, or the man who killed your brother, or an adulterer whom you find in bed with your wife, does not count as murder. Our sources make no general statement about murder, but they reach comparable views about when it is or is not acceptable to kill, by different means.’

62. See Jill Harries, *Law and Crime in the Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 118-32 and O.F. Robinson, *The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 41-47.

63. On the lack of common proverbs or sayings explicitly prohibiting murder, see Morgan, *Popular Morality*, 181-82.

planned murder, arson and other crimes against citizens and country, let those who have confessed be treated as if they were manifestly guilty of capital crimes and let them be punished in the traditional manner.⁶⁴

Seneca the Younger offers various moral reflections on murder suggesting it is inappropriate.⁶⁵ As for Jewish writings, the command is common in the LXX with two prominent examples from the Decalogue (Exod. 20.13; Deut. 5.18). It appears in the vice lists of Mt. 19.18; Rev. 21.8; 22.15; Barn. 20.2; Did. 5.2 (cf. ἀνδροφόνος in 1 Tim. 1.9).⁶⁶ The injunction against murder also regularly occurs in early Christian writings as a quotation of the Decalogue.⁶⁷ Although predominantly informed by the Jewish Scriptures, Peter's view of murder would thus have significant overlap with both Roman law and moral reflection on the vice of murder.

Κλέπτῃς

The concept of *theft* was fairly broad in Roman thinking, including embezzlement, fraud, or taking something without consent.⁶⁸ As Zimmermann notes, 'no intention permanently to deprive the owner was required.'⁶⁹ There were varied degrees of punishment for theft.⁷⁰ For example, Ulpian provides us with a discussion of what should happen to those who engage in temple-theft:

I know that many temple-thieves have been condemned to the beasts, some have been burnt alive, others have been suspended on the fork.

64. Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 52.1-36.

65. Seneca the Younger, *Clem.* 1.5.2; 13.2; 25.1; 2.4.2; *Ira* 2.5.1; 5.3; 3.3.6; *Ep.* 7.2.3-5; 14.4-5; *Ben.* 7.19.8.

66. See Sarah Currie, 'The Killer within: Christianity and the Invention of Murder in the Roman World', *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 8 (1996), pp. 156-70, for how this changed in later Christian ethical thinking.

67. Mt. 5.21; 19.18; Mk 10.19; Lk. 18.20; Rom. 13.9; Jas 2.11; 1 Clem. 57.7; Barn. 19.5; Did. 2.2.

68. R. Zimmermann, 'Theft', in Simon Hornblower et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 1453. See further Reinhard Zimmermann, *The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition* (Cape Town: Juta, 1990), p. 922f.

69. Zimmermann, 'Theft', p. 1453.

70. See further Robinson, *Criminal Law of Ancient Rome*, pp. 23-29, Harries, *Law and Crime*, pp. 43-58.

But the penalty should be moderated to a maximum of *ad bestias*, which should be inflicted on those who band together, break into a temple by night and carry off the god's offerings. Theft of an article of modest value by day should be punished by the mines or, if the thief occupies a higher status by deportation to an island.⁷¹

Temple theft constitutes a heinous crime since it is an offence against the gods. Also at play is the status of the person in question. Depending on the item and the status of the thief, theft could arouse varied judgements, but usually in interpersonal cases, double the amount that was stolen or lost was to be paid back.⁷² Epictetus writes that 'Epicurus himself does not declare the act of theft evil, but only getting caught, and merely because it is impossible to feel certain that one will not be detected, he says, "Do not steal".'⁷³

The Jewish Scriptures do not provide much discussion around the concept of theft.⁷⁴ From the contexts where *κλέπτῃς* is used we see that it often refers to those who break into houses with the intention of taking goods belonging to another (Exod. 22.1; Hos. 7.1). Among early Christian writings it found in the vice catalogue of Mt. 19.18//Mk 10.19//Lk. 18.20; Rom. 13.9; 1 Cor. 6.10; Eph. 4.28 and here in 1 Peter.⁷⁵ It seems to be taken for granted among Jewish and Christian writings that the word would be understood, since no explanations are given.

Because Peter is writing to converts who grew up with Greco-Roman thinking, we may suggest that Peter understands *κλέπτῃς* in a broad sense common to his contemporaries. Peter makes no distinctions in his understanding of theft, but rather instructs them to avoid such activities, lest they suffer for the wrong reasons. We thus see again that Peter advocates a standard and common ethical maxim of Roman law and society. It is not clear whether this vice is contextual. Its presence in this list may suggest that there were some

71. Justinian, *Digesta* 48.13.7. The translation is from Richard A. Bauman, *Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome* (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 151-52.

72. Zimmermann, 'Theft', p. 1453.

73. Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.7.12-13.

74. References to *κλέπτῃς* include Exod. 22.1; Deut. 24.7; Ps. 49.18; Prov. 29.24; Job 24.14; 30.5; Sir. 5.14; 20.25; Hos. 7.1; Joel 2.9; Obad. 1.5; Zech. 5.3-4; Isa. 1.23; Jer. 2.26; 30.3; Ep. Jer. 1.57.

75. The majority of occurrences are used metaphorically in conjunction with something 'sudden, surprising, or unexpected'. See Mt. 24.43; Lk. 12.39; 1 Thess. 5.2, 4; 2 Pet. 3.10; Rev. 3.3; 16.15; 1 Clem. 35.8.

among the audiences of these Christians for whom such an instruction was necessary.⁷⁶ Given such a broad audience and the desire to retaliate against those who harm these Christians, it may be appropriate instruction. However, it may just be a conventional piece of wisdom that Peter is offering by way of pre-emptive instruction.

Κακοποιός

Lattke suggests that *κακοποιός* is one who does evil, so an ‘evil-doer’ or ‘criminal’.⁷⁷ The word is not common in Greco-Roman sources. One of the examples we have is from Polibius who writes of ‘Sosibius, the unfaithful guardian of Ptolemy Epiphanes, [who] was a creature of extraordinary cunning who long retained his power, and was the instrument of many crimes (*κακοποιόν*) at court’ (15.25).⁷⁸ Achtemeier notes that the ‘Latin equivalent of *κακοποιός*, *maleficus*, later came to be used in descriptions of Christians, e.g., Suetonius *Vit.* 6.16.2.’⁷⁹ Tacitus (*Ann.* 2.69.3) understands *maleficus* as a sorcerer.⁸⁰ Tertullian (*Scorp.* 12) and Cyprian (*Test.* 3.37) also translate *κακοποιός* as *maleficus*, but it is unlikely they intend it in the narrow sense of *sorcery*. Holloway suggests the Latin equivalent of *κακοποιός* is *malus homo*.⁸¹ The term is thus a general one describing various kinds of activities that are considered evil or harmful.

The adjective is also rare in the Septuagint, used only twice.⁸² First, Prov. 12.4 states that a ‘*κακοποιός* wife destroys a man.’ Another reference from

76. For a comparative discussion see, Ernest Best, ‘Thieves in the Church: Ephesians 4:28’, *IBS* 14 (1992) pp. 2-9 (4), who notes in reference to Ephesians but this equally applies to 1 Peter, ‘Since our letter is a general letter directed not to one church but to a number it may for that reason give us a better insight into the kind of people who became Christians in the early days.’

77. M. Lattke, ‘*κακοποιός*’, *EDNT*, III, p. 238. Paul A. Holloway, ‘1 Peter and Prejudice’, *STRev* 54 (2011), pp. 199-220 (202).

78. See also Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 1125a.

79. Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, p. 310 n. 76.

80. Cf. Lactantius, *Inst.* 2.16.4.

81. P.A. Holloway, *Coping with Prejudice: 1 Peter in Social Psychological Perspective*. WUNT 244 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), pp. 67-68.

82. The verb is used more often: Gen. 31.7, 29; 43.6; Lev. 5.4; Num. 35.23; Judg. 19.23; 1 Sam. 12.25; 25.34; 26.21; 2 Sam. 20.6; 24.17; 1 Kgs. 16.33; 1 Chron.

Prov. 24.19 instructs the wise to not rejoice with the *κακοποιός*. Πονηρός is used as a synonym for *κακοποιός* in Prov. 24.20.

In the Gospels, Pilate questions, *ἐποίησεν κακόν*; (Mk 15.14).⁸³ *κακοποιός* in this instance indicates criminality. The verb is used of ‘doing harm’ in Mk 3.4 (cf. Lk. 6.9). Even the noun *κακία* is rare amongst early Christian writings.⁸⁴ The only other use of the verb is found in 3 Jn 11, where it indicates ‘doing harm’ to those in the Christian community.

The word is used several times in 1 Pet. (2.12, 14; 4.15; cf. 3.17 and *κακοποιέω*). If this is the case, one wonders if the description was in use during the time 1 Peter was written (cf. 2.12; 4.4), and thus Peter exhorts his readers not to act in a way that would be considered criminal or evil, unless it contravened their devotion to God (3.13-17; 4.19). If the word indicates *sorcery*, as noted above, then Elliott suggests that it could be ‘a third illegal act against which our author warns’.⁸⁵ However, it is unclear whether Peter has such specificity in mind, given the other uses of the concept throughout 1 Peter. Brox suggests regarding the use of the adjective in 2.12 that these Christians are ‘als Kriminelle diffamiert’.⁸⁶ Holloway states: ‘To be slandered as *κακοποιός*, therefore, is to be accused of being a *malus homo*, a truly ominous charge that adduces the governor’s imperial mandate and places Christians at odds not only with public opinion but with Roman rule.’⁸⁷ Thus, it seems better to understand this term as referring to someone who does something considered wrong, either legally, culturally or ethically.⁸⁸ This fits with the contrasts in 3.17 between *κακοποιέω* and *ἀγαθοποιέω*. First Pet. 2.14 notes the responsibility of the governors to *ἐκδίκησιν κακοποιῶν*, the same term used here. This establishes an intratextual connection within the dis-

21.17; 1 Esd. 6.32; Ezra 4.13, 15; Est. 1.1; 8.12; 1 Macc. 5.48; Prov. 4.16; 6.18; 11.15; 19.7; Sir. 19.28; Isa. 11.9; Jer. 4.22; 10.5.

83. Also, Mt. 27.23, *κακὸν ἐποίησεν*; Lk. 23.22, *κακὸν ἐποίησεν οὗτος*.

84. Mt. 6.34; Acts 8.22; Rom. 1.29; 1 Cor. 5.8; 14.20; Eph. 4.31; Col. 3.8; Tit. 3.3; Jas 1.21; 1 Pet. 2.1, 16; 1 Clem. 35.8; 45.7; 2 Clem. 10.1; Barn. 2.8; 20.1; Ign. Eph. 19.3; Herm. Sim. 9.29.1, 3; Did. 5.1.

85. Elliott, *1 Peter*, p. 784.

86. N. Brox, *Der erste Petrusbrief* (EKK, 21; Zürich: Benziger Verlag, 1979), p. 113.

87. Holloway, *Coping with Prejudice*, p. 68.

88. Holloway (*Coping with Prejudice*, pp. 22, 67) translates *κακοποιός* as ‘criminal’.

course of 1 Peter. Peter's point is that Christians are not to suffer punishment from governing authorities for these kinds of actions but are to be willing to suffer for their devotion to Christ (4.16). This cannot therefore be understood as a merely conventional item but is specifically related to the contextual discourse of 1 Peter.

Ἄλλοτριεπίσκοπος

Ἄλλοτριεπίσκοπος is a rare word that has been the focus of scholarly attention. Achtemeier notes that 'it is not used in any other NT list of vices, nor does it appear in any other place in the Greek Bible or in non-Christian Greek literature.'⁸⁹ Suggested meanings range from 'revolutionary'⁹⁰ to 'fraudulent leadership'⁹¹ but recently scholars have suggested 'meddling in the affairs of others', as the best way to understand this term.⁹² Jeannine Brown has helpfully argued that 'ἄλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 1 Pet 4:15 fits the parameters of the Greco-Roman *topos* of meddling and likely refers to movement outside of culturally appropriate social boundaries. This type of interference in the social order has political ramifications and as such would be understood as involving insubordination to the *polis*.'⁹³ It is for this reason that Epictetus has to defend the Cynic's role in overseeing human affairs, which some take to be meddling. Epictetus has to defend the actions of the Cynic because they are conventionally deemed inappropriate (Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.22.97-99). As Brown notes, 'Interference or meddling, then, is overseeing the activities of others when one has no proper right to do so.'⁹⁴ The Roman hatred for people who meddled in other people's affairs is well documented in Plu-

89. Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, p. 310.

90. A. Bischoff, 'Ἄλλοτρι(ο)επίσκοπος', *ZNW* 7 (1906), pp. 271-74.

91. K. Erbes, 'Was bedeutet ἄλλοτριεπίσκοπος 1 Pt 4,15?' *ZNW* 19 (1919-20), pp. 39-44.

92. See Elliott, *1 Peter*, pp. 785-88 and Jobes, *1 Peter*, pp. 296-97. Alternatively, see Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, pp. 311-13, for the argument that it means one who embezzles funds, and thus conforms to the illegal activity of the first two vices, and perhaps the third.

93. Jeannine K. Brown, 'Just a Busybody? A Look at the Greco-Roman *Topos* of Meddling for Defining ἄλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 1 Peter 4:15', *JBL* 125 (2006), pp. 549-68 (567).

94. Brown, 'Just a Busybody?', p. 554.

tarch's *περί πολυπραγμοσύνης*.⁹⁵ Brown is right to conclude that 'prohibition against this particular behaviour would fit well with the admonition in the *Haustafel* for Christians to submit to and remain within the sphere in which they find themselves (2.11–3.12).'⁹⁶

Conventional and Contextual

That Peter does not elaborate on these specific vices assumes a shared understanding about what is being prohibited for these Christians. Although *κακοποιός* is integrated into the rest of the letter, the other terms do not *explicitly* appear to be related to the strategy and purpose of 1 Peter. It may be therefore that Peter has chosen this list as illustrative of the kinds of activities that incur suffering that these Christians should not be associated with. Thus, Goppelt rightly asks how we are to understand the purpose of this statement: 'Is er als rhetorische Antithese zu verstehen, die zwei grundsätzlich verschiedene Arten von Leiden unter der Gesellschaft deutlich machen soll oder als realistische Warnung, dem Namen Christi nicht durch kriminelles Verhalten Schande zu machen?'⁹⁷ Has Peter merely chosen this list of items to make his point, or does he think these Christians might actually participate in such activity? Elliott sees the purpose of this statement as being its rhetorical effect: 'It is hardly likely that the author thinks he must dissuade his readers from engaging in murder or theft. These crimes, along with wrongdoing, are mentioned as misdeeds self-evidently to be avoided.'⁹⁸ On the other hand Achtemeier warns against a 'romanticizing of the early Church' in this regard.⁹⁹

Given the oppression under which certain of 1 Peter's readers lived, they could well be tempted to respond with thievery and even murder. Indeed, 2:18-24 seeks to dissuade slaves from violent retaliation when their masters unjustly beat them. We should, therefore, read the offen-

95. Plutarch, *Mor.* 515B-523B, titled 'On Being a Busybody'.

96. Brown, 'Just a Busybody?', p. 549.

97. L. Goppelt, *Der erste Petrusbrief* (KEK, 12/1; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), p. 308.

98. Elliott, *1 Peter*, p. 784.

99. Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, p. 311.

ses of 4:15 as genuine possibilities. 1 Peter is in earnest that none of the readers should truly be found guilty of such acts.¹⁰⁰

Rather than opting for a homogenous view of these Christian communities, Achtemeier is correct that these instructions may indeed be necessary for some members, such as slaves, or even wives, desiring retaliation for abuse suffered. However, it also seems plausible that many of these Christian communities would see at least murder and theft as wrong (Exod. 20.13, etc.), and likely understand evil-behavior and meddling in other affairs as wrong. Thus, why has Peter chosen to list these items? If Christians do not engage in these activities, then they will be model citizens. And it is only their confession of Christ that will cause them to suffer (4.16). Along with pastoral concern for some who might actually commit these crimes, this list commends conventional ethics that conform both to Christian teaching and societal expectations. Thus, while these elements may be related to *contextual* concerns among the scattered Christian communities of Anatolia, they have further been appropriated as *conventional* wisdom that indicates an overlap in ethical visions and as a means for rhetorical instruction.

The Virtues in 1 Peter 3.8

The opening phrase, τὸ δὲ τέλος πάντες, suggests that this is the concluding section to the household code which began at 2.13. The use of πάντες suggests that this conclusion applies to everyone in the Christian community (as did 2.13-17), and not to any specific groups named within this section.¹⁰¹ These final virtues are to describe the character and conduct of all Christians to whom this letter is addressed.

100. M. Dubis, *Messianic Woes in First Peter: Suffering and Eschatology in 1 Peter 4:12–19* (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), p. 134.

101. Elliott, *1 Peter*, p. 601, suggests that πάντες may form a literary *inclusio* with 2.13. This adds to the plausibility of seeing 3.8-12 as the conclusion of 2.13–3.7.

Ὅμοφρων

Ὅμοφρων is a rare word found only here in early Christian writings.¹⁰² BDAG describes the word as pertaining ‘to being like-minded’.¹⁰³ The word is by no means common in Jewish or Greco-Roman authors, either. It is found twice in the pseudepigrapha, once with a reference to conspiring together in *Sib. Or.* 3.399 and in *Ps.-Phoc.* 1.30 which suggests that people should live together in agreement. Josephus uses the word twice, indicating a united perspective (*War* 2.160; 3.459). On familial relationships Philo describes Moses’ mother and father as united more due to their ὁμόφροσύνη than because of blood (*Mos.* 1.7). Philo further claims that ὁμόφροσύνη is necessary to bring together houses, cities and nations so that all may have εὐδαιμονία (*Virt.* 1.119). He also suggests that those sent by God to rescue humanity will have ὁμόφροσύνη as one of their characteristics (*Praem.* 1.87). He urges against anyone who would seek to teach others ἀλογεῖν ὁμοφροσύνης (*Flacc.* 1.52).

In Homer’s *Iliad* ὁμόφροσύνη is praised as a virtue (22.263), and Odysseus says to Nausicaa that the best situation is for husband and wife to be ὁμοφρονέοντε (*Od.* 6.181-185).¹⁰⁴ Dio Chrysostom notes that a key element in the safety of the household is the ὁμόφροσύνη of master and mistress, and then goes on to stress that ὁμόνοια (‘concord’) is necessary for good relationships to flourish (*Or.* 38.15-16).¹⁰⁵ The word is also used in various military contexts. Herodotus uses it of the Greeks who are united in thought and purpose in battle (*Hist.* 9.2; cf. 8.3). Similarly, Xenophon uses it of those who are united in perspective against a common enemy (*Xen. Hell.* 7.5.7).¹⁰⁶ Dio Cassius describes a situation of power among those who are united in per-

102. The first time that I can find it used beyond 1 Peter is in Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 7.5.1 and 10.5.24. See *TLNT*, III, pp. 580-82.

103. BDAG, s.v. ‘ὁμόφρων’.

104. See also Plutarch, *Amat.* 24.

105. On ὁμόνοια, see Plutarch, *Frat. amor.* 479A, 483D, 490E-F. Concord between citizens (ὁμόνοια) is defined by Aristotle (claiming to follow common usage) as political φιλία (*Eth. nic.* 1167a22-b3).

106. In military contexts, see also Dio Cassius, *Hist. rom.* 27.91.4 and 46.38.4 and Josephus, *War* 2.160; 3.459.

spectives on policy, and that to be divided would perhaps render defeat (*Hist. rom.* 50.21.4).¹⁰⁷

In 1 Peter, to ‘be like-minded’ is to be shaped and constrained by a similar pattern of thinking.¹⁰⁸ This virtue encourages harmonious thinking, and thus solidarity, for the Christian community, and no doubt the letter of 1 Peter sets out to shape and instruct the pattern of that thinking which the Christian community is to adopt as they navigate life in the Greco-Roman world. That this is found in the conclusion to the *Haustafel* is noteworthy, as Peter may have specifically chosen this word to help foster concord among the households of those addressed, specifically those where Christians and pagans cohabit. This may further be generally applied to the Christian community which is to foster concord among its members those that they may mutually support and benefit those struggling. Given its rarity, this is probably a specific item chosen by the author to aid his ethical instruction and aid of these Christians.

Συμπαθής

While *συμπαθής* can be understood as ‘sympathetic’ or ‘understanding’,¹⁰⁹ the semantic range is wider than this, suggesting a feeling for, alongside or with someone or something.¹¹⁰ Elliott suggests that it ‘denotes the solidarity of affection valued by Greek and Roman authors for fostering group unity (Polyb. 2.56.7; Dionys. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.45.6; cf. Jos. *Ant.* 19.330)’.¹¹¹ Among Jewish writers, *4 Maccabees* has a particular fondness for the term

107. Plutarch (*Arat.* 9.5) uses it in a similar manner noting that ‘Greek prowess was invincible, whenever it enjoyed good order, harmonious discipline, and a sensible leader.’

108. Cf. Paul who uses the phrase *ἀπὸ φρονεῖν* in Rom. 15.5 and Phil. 4.2. See also Rom. 12.16 and Phil. 2.2, 5 for conceptual similarities.

109. *TLNT*, III, pp. 319-20.

110. Cf. LN, 25.58, ‘pertaining to feeling sympathy for someone or something’.

111. Elliott, *1 Peter*, p. 603. However, it may be seen negatively (e.g. Seneca the Younger, *Clem.* 2.5.1; 2.6.4). B.N. Longenecker, *Remember the Poor: Paul, Poverty, and the Greco-Roman World* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), p. 75, who comments that pity ‘was an “error” because it involved putting one’s self into the shoes of another, feeling his pain and being moved to act solely on the basis of an emotional twinge. Emotional involvement of this kind was thought to contradict the archetype of independent self-sufficiency (*αὐτάρχεια*)—i.e. the state of being content with one’s own circumstances in life without being disturbed by emotion.’

(5.25; 6.13; 13.23; 14.13-14, 18, 20; 15.4, 7, 11). In this writing it carries the sense of deep emotion, as in a mother's love which is greater than a father's (15.4). It is an attribute of God in giving the Jews the law (5.25). *T. Benj.* 4.4 lists it among virtuous qualities of faithful Jews. In Josephus it is used in the context of battle where one group that has had victory comes to the aid of another that is struggling (*War* 2.579). Importantly, this virtue is expressed in action, especially towards those who suffer (Philo, *Spec.* 2.115; 4.202; cf. *4 Macc.* 6.13).

It is rare among early Christian writings, found in 1 Pet. 3.8; Heb. 4.15; 10.34 and later in the writings of Ignatius (*Ign. Rom.* 6.3; *Ign. Smyrn.* 4.2).¹¹² In Hebrews we see the same emphasis on an emotion that leads to action in the context of severe suffering when this community had 'compassion' on those who were in prison (10.34). This is seen ultimately in Jesus who 'sympathizes' with people in their weaknesses and is moved to action (4.15). Ignatius asks the Romans to sympathize with him in his desire to be an 'imitator of the suffering of God' (6.3), playing on the words *πάθος* (suffering) and *συμπαθής* (sympathy). Solidarity with the *αἷμα θεοῦ* (*Ign. Eph.* 4.1) is again seen in *Ign. Smyrn.* 4.2 where he desires *συμπαθεῖν αὐτῷ*, a sense which translators interpret as suffering 'together with him'¹¹³ or 'suffer with him'.¹¹⁴ In the context of 1 Peter, Elliott suggests that 'it is akin in sense to its parallel *eusplagchnoi* ("tender-hearted") but, in the light of the suffering of the addressees, may further imply sharing the feelings, including the sufferings (*pathēmata*), of fellow-believers.'¹¹⁵ They are to be united in virtue and conviction and feel with one another as they endure the shame and prejudice of outsiders in service to God and one another. Given that one of the key purposes of this letter is to aid Christians in their 'coping with prejudice',¹¹⁶ our author has likely chosen this term to highlight a virtue that will direct his audiences.

112. And later in Clement of Alexandria, *Protr.* 4.

113. See *The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English Translations* (ed. and trans. Michael W. Holmes; Grand Rapids: Baker, 3rd edn, 2007), p. 253.

114. *The Apostolic Fathers* (2 vols.; ed. and trans. Kirsopp Lake; LCL; London: William Heinemann, 1912–13), I, p. 257.

115. Elliott, *1 Peter*, p. 604.

116. See Holloway, '1 Peter and Prejudice', pp.199-220.

Φιλᾶδελφος

BDAG notes that φιλάδελφος carries the ‘sense having affection for an associate, *having brotherly love, having mutual affection*’.¹¹⁷ Vögtle notes the infrequent use of φιλαδελφία outside Christian writings.¹¹⁸ It is used predominantly of blood relationships, as in *4 Maccabees* (e.g. 13.21, 23, 26; 14.1; 15.10).¹¹⁹ Greco-Roman writers, such as Epictetus, use the word to denote ‘brotherly love’ (*Discourses* 3.3.9).¹²⁰ Plutarch’s treatise *De fraterno amore* is a rare treatise on this *topos* in Greco-Roman thinking. Hierocles (*On Duties* 4.27.20) provides another example, but like Plutarch’s essay it is set within the context of familial ethics. It should not be understood with respect to gender as the term can refer either to biological sisters (Plutarch, *Quaest. rom.* 267E) or brothers (Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.3.17).¹²¹

Although the adjectival form found in 1 Pet. 3.8 is a *hapax legomenon* among early Christian writings, the noun is found in Rom. 12.10; 1 Thess. 4.9; Heb. 13.1; 1 Pet. 1.22; 2 Pet. 1.7; 1 Clem. 47.5; 48.1.¹²² In each example it is used of fictive kinship to stress the familial bonds that have been established in the Christian community.¹²³ Lucian, *Pergr.* 13 ‘claims that Jesus taught that all Christians are brothers and satirizes the extremes to which Christians went to actualize such love for fellow Christians, indicating thereby the commonness of such activity’.¹²⁴ Thus, its appearance in this vir-

117. BDAG, s.v. ‘φιλάδελφος’. Emphasis original.

118. Vögtle, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge*, 188.

119. See also Philo, *Legat.* 87, 92; Josephus, *Ant.* 4.26; Plutarch, *Frat. amor.*

120. The word is found in inscriptions in Bithynia, see G.H.R. Horsely (ed.), *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity: A Review of the Greek Inscriptions and Papyri Published in 1978* (10 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), III, p. 87 (see number 74).

121. P. Trebilco, *Self-Designations and Group Identity in the New Testament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 24-25.

122. See also Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 2.9 (citing Rom. 12.10); *Paed.* 3.11.74 (citing 1 Pet. 3.8-9); *Paed.* 3.12.96 (citing Rom. 12.8-13).

123. Second Macc. 15.14 uses it to describe a relationship with Israel. And Pseudo-Socrates, *Ep.* 28.12 uses it in the sense of ‘friendly’. See John S. Kloppenborg, ‘ΦΙΛΑΔΕΛΦΙΑ, ΘΕΟΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΣ and the Dioscuri: Rhetorical Engagement in 1 Thess. 4.9-12’, *NTS* 39 (1993) pp. 265-89 (271). See further R. Aasgaard, ‘*My Beloved Brothers and Sisters!*’: *Christian Siblingship in Paul* (London: T. & T. Clark, 2004), pp. 151-77.

124. Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, p. 223 n. 37.

tue list is not surprising. Once again Peter highlights an intense virtue that will aid the solidarity and social cohesion of the community. By maintaining love for one another, which is the kind of love siblings are to have for one another (1.22), they will be able to withstand the onslaught of social prejudice directed towards them. Donelson suggests that this term ‘conveys a commitment to community but does so more by way of deeds’.¹²⁵ Peter appeals to this virtue to promote action amidst difficult circumstances, not sentiment. In a letter that appeals to the audiences as ἀγαπητοί (2.11; 4.12), where they are explicitly instructed τὴν ἀδελφότητα ἀγαπᾶτε (2.17), it is difficult to see this as a mere conventional item. Rather, the author has highlighted this virtue as it specifically fits with his overall purposes.

Εὐσπλαγχνος

This is a rare adjective which literally refers to ‘entrails’ but is metaphorically used as ‘having tender feelings for someone’.¹²⁶ It is used in contexts of prayer to describe YHWH as ‘compassionate’.¹²⁷ *T. Sim.* 4.4 uses it to describe Joseph who has the Spirit of God within him. The Jesus tradition employs the verbal form several times to describe Jesus’ *compassion* towards others.¹²⁸ In Christian literature εὐσπλαγχνος is found in Eph. 4.32; 1 Pet. 3.8; 1 Clem. 29.1; 54.1; Pol. 5.2; 6.1.¹²⁹ ‘The compound *eusplanchnos* (Eph 4:32; 1 Pet 3:8) should not be translated “benevolent, good-hearted”; it is intensive. But whereas in secular Greek having good or strong entrails means being courageous, in Christian terms it means to be tenderly merciful, compassionate.’¹³⁰ It is found in Eph. 4.32 as part of a virtue list which may derive in some way from another virtue list in Col. 3.12, which uses σπλάγχνα.¹³¹ First

125. L.R. Donelson, *I & II Peter and Jude: A Commentary* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010), p. 98, who further notes that, ‘This obligation includes personal loyalty but focuses upon the material support of food and shelter and upon the provision of protection and aid in public life.’

126. BDAG, s.v. ‘εὐσπλαγχνος’. See *TLNT*, s.v. ‘σπλάγχνα’, III, pp. 273-75.

127. *Gk. Apoc. Ezra* 1.10; *Apoc. Sedr.* 15.1; *Pr. Man.* 1.7; cf. *T. Zeb.* 9.7.

128. *Mt.* 9.36; 14.14; 15.32; 18.27; 20.34; *Mk.* 1.41; 6.34; 8.2; 9.22; *Lk.* 7.13; 10.33; 15.20.

129. Cf. *Jas.* 5.11, who coins a new word with πολύσπλαγχνος (see *Herm. Vis.* 1.3.2; 2.2.8; 4.2.3; *Herm. Mand.* 9.1.2).

130. *TLNT*, III, p. 275.

131. A.T. Lincoln, *Ephesians* (WBC, 42; Dallas: Word Books, 1990), p. 309.

Clement 29.1 uses it as a description of God, while 54.1 uses it rhetorically to encourage compassion among the community, especially on those who have been divisive. Polycarp uses it as part of a virtue list for the community in 5.2 and in a virtue list for the *πρεσβύτεροι* in 6.1. Elliott suggests a similarity of *εὐσπλαγγνος* with *συμπαθής* in 1 Pet. 3.8.¹³² This may well be the case, but even if so, Peter's point is to emphasize again the necessary solidarity of Christians with others, urging them to express compassion to one another, and perhaps those beyond the Christian community. Following on from the previous item, this again fits neatly within the purposes of 1 Peter to create committed communal relationships of care and concern for one another. Its distinctive nuance and rarity also indicate that the author has specifically chosen this virtue for his catalogue. Furthermore, the natural fit with the rest of the discourse makes it unlikely to be just a conventional item.

Ταπεινόφρων

Ταπεινόφρων¹³³ and cognates have different meanings within the Greco-Roman world when compared with the Jewish and Christian usage.¹³⁴ Ταπεινοφροσύνη is seen as something honorable in Prov. 29.23 LXX, something which the Lord will reward with glory and something which is contrary to ὕβρις.¹³⁵ The verb is used in the context of prayer to YHWH, where the psalmist prays, 'If I was not humble-minded (*ἐταπεινοφρόνου*) but exalted my soul, like the weaned child against its mother, like a requital it is, against

132. Elliott, *1 Peter*, p. 605.

133. A textual variant replaces *ταπεινόφρονες* with *φιλοφρόνες*, but given the overwhelming external support for *ταπεινόφρονες* (P⁷² & A B C ψ), it is unlikely that *φιλοφρόνες* is original.

134. On the root *ταπεινός* see *TLNT*, III, pp. 369-71 and Vögtle, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge*, pp. 153-54, 252. On the Hebrew Bible background, see especially, John P. Dickson and Brian S. Rosner, 'Humility as a Social Virtue in the Hebrew Bible?' *VT* 54 (2004), pp. 459-79.

135. There is some debate as to whether 'humility', defined by Dickson and Rosner as 'lowering oneself before an equal or lesser', is a virtue in the Hebrew Bible. Dickson and Rosner ('Humility', p. 479) argue that 'the virtue of humility, prized in later Judaism and early Christianity, is nowhere to be found in the canonical Hebrew Scriptures of ancient Israel.' They are responding to the work of S.B. Dawes, 'Humility: Whence this Strange Notion?', *ExpTim* 103 (1991), pp. 72-75; Dawes, 'ANAWA in Translation and Tradition', *VT* 41 (1991), pp. 38-48.

my soul' (LXX Ps. 130.2). It is seen as a positive disposition to practice in *Sib. Or.* 8.480.

In contrast to the positive Jewish understanding, Achtemeier rightly notes that, 'Such an attitude was normally considered a vice in Hellenistic culture.'¹³⁶ Plutarch uses it of Trigranes who was humiliated when his kingdom became the spoil of war.¹³⁷ In describing the power of *Fortune*, Plutarch notes that nonetheless 'she cannot make the good and valiant and high-souled man base or cowardly, *ταπεινόφρονα*, ignoble, or envious ...'¹³⁸ According to Epictetus, 'Reason will never tell you to be *ταπεινός* and broken-hearted, or to depend on another, or to reproach either god or human' (*Discourses* 3.24.58).¹³⁹ Josephus uses it in a negative sense in describing the story of 'Galba's call to the imperial dignity and his return to Rome from Spain, on the charge of *ταπεινοφροσύνη* brought against him by the soldiers' (*War* 4.494). Goppelt concludes that 'In der griechisch-hellenistischen Ethik wird die Haltung des *ταπεινός* negativ als niedrige Knechtsgesinnung qualifiziert, die des Freien unwürdig ist.'¹⁴⁰ Elliott notes the contrast between Jewish, Christian and Greco-Roman thinking: 'In the highly competitive and stratified world of Greco-Roman antiquity, only those of degraded social status were "humble", and humility was regarded as a sign of weakness and shame, an inability to defend one's honor. Therefore, the high valued placed on humility by Israelites and Christians is remarkable.'¹⁴¹ Christian tradition, in keeping with the rare Jewish use, employs it as a virtue because Jesus was thought to have embodied such a disposition (Mk 1.41; Mt. 9.36; Lk 7.13).¹⁴² In Phil. 2.3 we have it as part of Paul's paraenesis to a Greco-Roman audience to think of others before themselves, and to practice *humility*. This is then shown to be embodied in Christ (2.8) in the Christological hymn of 2.6-11. In Acts it is used to describe Paul's humility (Acts 20.19), and in Pauline tradition it is used as part of a virtue list in Eph. 4.2. In Colossians there is a varied use of the word, with it being used negatively in two occurrences in

136. Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, p. 223 n. 42.

137. Plutarch, *Mor.* 336E.

138. Plutarch, *Mor.* 475E.

139. See also Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.9.10.

140. Goppelt, *Der erste Petrusbrief*, p. 333. So also Dickson and Rosner, 'Humility', p. 259 n. 3.

141. Elliott, *1 Peter*, p. 605.

142. See Craig A. Evans, 'Jesus' Ethic of Humility', *TJ* 13 (1992), pp. 127-38.

the sense of *self-abasement* (Col. 2.18, 23) but also as part of a virtue list in Col. 3.12.

The verbal form is used throughout 1 Clement.¹⁴³ In 1 Clem. 16.7, Clement describes Jesus' self-humiliation (cf. Phil. 2.8). In 17.2 it is used of Abraham as he contemplates God's glory, while in 30.3 it is used as part of a virtue list in conjunction with *ὁμόνοια*. The other references are used to exhort the Corinthians to a humble-mindedness. Barnabas uses it as part of the two ways tradition, issuing a command, 'Οὐχ ὑψώσεις σεαυτὸν ἔσση δὲ ταπεινόφρων κατὰ πάντα' (19.3). Ignatius uses it to instruct the Ephesians on how they are to engage with outsiders, instructing them to be humble in the face of boastful opposition (Ign. *Eph.* 10.2). Finally in Hermas it is used as part of a short virtue list for those who have the Spirit from above (Herm. Mand. 1.8).¹⁴⁴ The sense of having a humble disposition is clear in all these references.

In 1 Pet. 3.8 the adjective *ταπεινόφρων* is used as part of a virtue list to encourage the Christian communities of Anatolia to be humble in their disposition. In 1 Pet. 5.5 the noun *ταπεινοφροσύνη* is used. Support from the LXX is claimed in 5.5 with a citation from Prov. 3.34, which notes that [ὁ] θεός ὑπερηφάνοις ἀντιτάσσεται, ταπεινοῖς δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν.¹⁴⁵ This quotation is introduced with ὅτι, which is commonly used in 1 Peter to give a theological reason for conduct (2.21; 3.9, 18; 4.1, 8, 14, 17). Therefore, we see the call to humility is grounded in the character of God and supported by an appeal to the Jewish Scriptures. First, the specific nuance of this term within Jewish and Christian sources and its rarity, indicates it cannot be considered a conventional item. Second, the wider connection to 5.5 suggests the author has specifically chosen this term.

Conventional and Contextual

Is this list of virtues merely general instruction? Could this list have been taken from a Greco-Roman moral philosopher, or are these virtues contextual and specific, related to Peter's discourse and a part of his strategy? We shall

143. 1 Clem. 2.1; 13.1, 3; 16.1-2, 17; 17.2; 30.3; 38.2; 48.6; 62.2. The adjective *ταπεινόφρων* is used in 19.1.

144. See also Herm. Sim. 5.3.7; 7.1.4, 6.

145. Achtemeier (*1 Peter*, p. 333) notes the change from the LXX which has κύριος to 1 Peter and Jas 4.6 which both have θεός. He further notes that this may suggest a common tradition between these two authors.

discuss these virtues with reference to how they are to be understood within the context of 1 Peter. By showing various connections to the wider discourse, it is suggested that these terms were not randomly selected from conventional ethical sources, but rather that they cohere with the purpose and theme of 1 Peter.

The word *δμόφρονες* is rare, and as noted above, is etymologically connected to words like *σωφροσύνη* (4.7) and *ταπεινοφροσύνη* (3.8; 5.5), all stemming from *φρόνησις*. But there are other terms in 1 Peter that indicate an interest in patterns of thinking and disposition. In 1.13 Peter uses *διάνοια* in the sense of ‘disposition’.¹⁴⁶ Peter also uses the word *νήφω* (1.13; 4.7; 5.8), a metaphor used to indicate the opposite of incapacitated or intoxicated thinking, thus ‘sober-minded’.¹⁴⁷ *Συνείδησις* in 3.16 and 21 refers to ‘the inward faculty of distinguishing right and wrong, *moral consciousness, conscience*’.¹⁴⁸ In 1 Pet. 3.15, Peter uses ‘heart’, in a statement that expresses ‘one’s deepest conviction’.¹⁴⁹ In 1 Pet. 4.1, they are to ‘arm themselves with the same way of thinking’, where Peter uses the word *ἔννοια*. BDAG describes this as ‘the content of mental processing’.¹⁵⁰ Louw and Nida describe it as ‘a way of thinking’.¹⁵¹ Lest we think individualistically, we must remember that these are all exhortations to the *community*. Thus, they collectively are to embrace the pattern of thinking and teaching as given by 1 Peter, and thus they will be united in their disposition and express solidarity as Christian communities facing similar situations (cf. 5.9). There are therefore many conceptual links to *δμόφρονες* throughout 1 Peter.

The theme of suffering in 1 Peter is ubiquitous.¹⁵² The use of *εὐσπλαγχνοί* and *συμπαθεῖς* are therefore important virtues in a community facing social prejudice and suffering. In utilizing the virtue of compassion, Peter seems to have created a verbal echo between *συμπαθεῖς* and words like *πάθημα* and

146. BDAG, *s.v.* ‘φρόνησις’.

147. D.F. Watson, ‘Spiritual Sobriety in 1 Peter’, *ExpTim* 122 (2011), pp. 539-42.

148. BDAG, *s.v.* ‘συνείδησις’. Emphasis original

149. Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, p. 233.

150. BDAG, *s.v.* ‘ἔννοια’.

151. LN, 30.5, ‘a way of thinking’.

152. *πάθημα* (1 Pet. 1.11; 4.13; 5.1, 9); *πάσχω* (1 Pet. 2.19-21, 23; 3.14, 17-18; 4.1, 15, 19; 5.10). See P.H. Davids, *The First Epistle of Peter* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), pp. 30-44.

πάσχω. Thus, the communities are reminded that not only did Χριστὸς ἔπαθεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν (2.21) but that κοινωνεῖτε τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασιν (4.13). In this they are not alone as other members of their family (ἀδελφότης) are facing the same kind of suffering (παθημάτων, 5.9). These verbal echoes link συμπαθεῖς with the wider theme of suffering in 1 Peter and would have stood out in an oral culture.

Twice in 1 Peter the author stresses that they are Ἀγαπητοί (2.11; 4.12), who love Jesus (1.8), and who have to maintain love for one another (4.8), while in 1.22, using the feminine term φιλαδελφία, they are reminded and instructed to love one another sincerely.¹⁵³ Green suggests that other possible connections with φιλάδελφοι are ἀδελφότης (2.17; 5.9) and φιλήμα (5.13).¹⁵⁴ This establishes links between φιλάδελφοι and Peter's wider discourse. Furthermore, this term does not appear in any of the virtue lists surveyed, suggesting it is not a common item which Peter could have repeated.

That ταπεινοφροσύνη is not an arbitrarily selected virtue is evidenced from the use of cognates in 5.5. There the community is instructed to clothe themselves with ταπεινοφροσύνη because God gives grace to those who are ταπεινός (5.5). This establishes wider connections in the text, and thus suggests careful crafting by the author. Further we may note that ταπεινοφροσύνη was not considered a virtue, and thus its inclusion here does not fit within conventional Greco-Roman virtues.

Discussing many of the virtues listed in the Pastoral Epistles (e.g. σώφρων, δίκαιος, εὐσεβής) Trebilco notes that, 'Although again there are some examples of the use of this language in the LXX and other Jewish writings, these terms were all very much at home in the Hellenistic world as noteworthy virtues.'¹⁵⁵ Much the same could be said of these virtues in 3.8, except for ταπεινοφροσύνη. What this shows is that our author has appropriated four of the five virtues listed here that are at home within Greco-Roman culture.

153. S.R. Bechtler (*Following in his Steps: Suffering, Community, and Christology in 1 Peter* [SBLDS, 162; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998], p. 172) points out the parallelism between 1.22 and 4.8 which is, as he notes, unmistakable.

154. J.B. Green, *1 Peter* (THNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), p. 103.

155. P. Trebilco, *The Early Christians in Ephesus from Paul to Ignatius* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), p. 364.

Conclusion

In this article we have noted Peter's use of ethical catalogues in 1 Pet. 2.1; 3.8 and 4.15. The particular question that has concerned us is whether or not the particular vices and virtues listed by the author are merely the repetition of conventional moral values or whether they relate specifically to the purposes of Peter's discourse. We began by noting that the author of 1 Peter has utilized a popular form, ethical lists, to instruct his audience. In both content and form we see Peter's utilization of aspects of Greco-Roman pedagogy for the benefit of his audience. These ethical lists are not exhaustive and many other options of both vices and virtues were available, so why has our author included these items? In this article I have suggested that Peter's appeal and use of specific vices and virtues is not mere conventional morality, but rather specifically related to his discourse. This analysis suggests that the virtues and vices are thematically and at times linguistically integrated into other sections of Peter's discourse. This has been argued in detail with reference to the vices in 2.1; 4.15 and the virtues in 3.8. That Peter has used these terms without introduction or explanation suggests that he expected the audience to be familiar with such concepts and terms, and that they would understand his use of them. It is unlikely that this author would pick at random various vices or virtues if they were not pertinent to the community and the situations they were facing. Furthermore, we may suggest that these ethical lists provide insights into the social profile of those who have converted. As newer Christians from Gentile backgrounds these ethical lists provide laconic wisdom that can be placed within larger interpretive frameworks to be beneficial (cf. 1.15-16 and 2.21) in the outworking of their discipleship. Finally, some of these items are rare, or have a particular Christian nuance that makes them being conventional unlikely. Therefore, we suggest Peter has specifically chosen these terms within these lists to convey his ethical instruction for the benefit of his Christian audiences.